Abstract Climate action at the local level represents an important and unique complement to global and national level policies. The lack of accurate information of actions taken by local governments and explanations of the great variation in local climate policy adoption directly impairs our ability to more effectively motivate and assist local climate actions. This study quantitatively analyzes a wide range of local climate actions adopted by California cities. The selective adoption of different climate actions suggests some cities are more progressive than others, with city size and political preference as important predictors of a city"s progressiveness. Sea level rise seems to be the dominant perceived risk affecting cities" climate change adaption policies. Whether a city is more likely to keep its promise to mitigate climate change varies with the type of promise, with the ICLEI Cities for Climate Protection program more effective than the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement.
Introduction
In the absence of a national climate change policy in the U.S., local government actions There is a growing literature on local climate actions, most of which study motivations for taking action, processes of decision-making, and policy implementation using specific cases (Betsill, 2001; Kousky and Schneider, 2003; Lindseth, 2004; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Selin and Vandeveer, 2007; Engel and Orbach, 2008; Schreurs, 2008; Gore and Robinson, 2009) . Generally, these studies suggest the importance of motives (e.g., local environmentalism; fiscal, economic, and/or environmental co-benefits; perceived risks; and peer pressure), means (e.g., financial resources and technical expertise), and leadership (e.g., political champion within local authority). A small number of studies have tried to quantify the relationship between the characteristics of local jurisdictions and their political will to take local actions. Zahran et al. (2008) analyze the relationship between cities" membership in the ICLEI-CCP program and some aggregate measures on local climate change risks, emission intensities and socio-demographic characteristics, suggesting the importance of civic capacity and existing level of GHG emissions. Kraus (2010) employs a multilevel analysis to examine cities" adoption of the MCPA, indicating that local demographic, government, and economic characteristics, rather than state policies, significantly correlate with cities" adoption of the MCPA. However, there has not been a quantitative study that goes beyond political commitment (i.e., memberships in the ICLEI-CCP, the MCPA, etc.) to analyze cities" adoption of substantial climate actions, nor has any study examined differences between local motivations to mitigate GHG emissions and motivations to adapt to climate change. This paper addresses some of the gaps in the previous empirical studies of local climate actions. Section two presents the research question and hypotheses. Section thee explains the data and methods used. Sections three through five describe and explain cities" adoption of different climate actions and relationships to their commitments. Section 6 concludes the paper and identifies future research needs.
This research focuses on understanding what climate actions California cities have adopted and why. As one of the largest and most diversified states in the U.S., California has 480 cities that vary widely in size, economy, partisanship majority, and natural geography. Local governments across California have undertaken a range of actions to address and respond to climate change, such as: measuring their own GHG emissions; setting targets to reduce these emissions; adopting various policies to reduce emissions; and taking steps to adapt to potential effects of climate change. This study looks into the different climate actions adopted by California cities to understand the different levels of local climate proactiveness among cities affected by the same set of state policies.
This study aims to statistically test three hypotheses for the first time. The first is that the differential adoption of various local climate actions by cities reflects their climate proactiveness. If cities, or their median voters, are rational, we should be able to observe cities first adopt actions that have a lower net local costs (or higher net local benefits), followed by actions with increasingly higher cost/benefit ratios. The more environmentally proactive a city is, the more likely it will adopt policies that are more costly and less frequently adopted by other cities.
The second hypothesis claims that different motivations drive local adaptation and mitigation actions. For local residents, mitigating GHG emissions is a pure public good, while taking collective measures to adapt to climate change is a club good. Although certain factors, such as financial resources, are required to implement both kinds of policies, there is little reason to expect the communities adopting mitigation actions and those adopting adaptation policies are similarly motivated.
The third and final hypothesis is that the extent to which political commitments affect cities" adoption of climate actions varies with the commitments" contents, such as dedicated resources and associated actions. That is, if a political commitment is merely rhetorical, it may have little or no relationship to the actions taken, because the price of breaking the commitment is at most the political reputation of some politicians. However, if a commitment comes with resource investment and/or contracted activities, it is more likely to increase the capacities of local communities to adopt further climate actions. 1 The results were provided by each individual jurisdiction and represent the jurisdiction"s current, adopted policies and/or programs. Cities may take a range of actions in order to mitigate climate change impact by reducing their GHG emissions. A variety of local mitigation actions have been taken by California cities. Table 2 lists the adoption rates of six questions about cities" mitigation actions. As expected, the second survey shows higher adoption rates for all of the four actions surveyed in both years.
( Table 2) There are interesting patterns of how cities" adoption rates vary with different policies that are consistent between the two years. The policies that are most widely adopted are formally set community-wide GHG emission reduction targets. Furthermore, cross tabulations of cities adopting the above climate actions find that if a city adopts a less common action, such as calculating GHG emissions baseline, it is highly likely that it also implemented those more widely adopted policies, such as having an individual climate change mitigation program or addressing specific projects" GHG emissions using CEQA mitigation measures.
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A similar interesting pattern of differentiated adoption of major CEQA mitigation measures/strategies applied by cities at the project-level is shown in Table 3 .
Energy/resource efficiency measures are about twice as frequently adopted as sequestration measures, and more than 20 times more often adopted than the purchase of offsets. The majority of cities adopting the less common measures also adopted the more common measures, but not vice versa. Among cities adopting offset measures, 88%
adopted building efficiency measures and VMT reduction measures, 75% adopted water conservation measures, and 68% adopted waste reduction/recycling measures and sequestration measures. Similarly, among cities adopting sequestration measures, about 80% adopted water conservation measures and waste reduction/recycling measures, 77%
adopted building efficiency measures, and 65% adopted VMT reduction measures.
( Table 3) Clearly, there has been great variation in California cities" adoption of climate policies.
The fact that cities adopting less common actions generally also adopted the more common ones suggests that the variation in local policy adoption is not because that some cities prefer certain actions while other cities prefer different ones. Instead, it seems to suggest the varied levels of effort or cost-benefit ratios associated with different actions.
For instance, ad hoc style mitigation at the individual project-level is perhaps easier to adopt than establishing mitigation policies/programs; individual mitigation policies and/or programs is perhaps less demanding than taking a systematic inventory and setting a formal emission target. At the project level, the progressive adoption of mitigation measures seems to reflect the incremental net costs of mitigation. While reducing GHG emissions, the efficiency measures also save energy and resource consumption, which provides a direct financial incentive. In fact, such measures may be implemented independent of the motivations for mitigating climate change. Sequestration measures are less attractive because they generally do gather revenue or reduce expenses, although there may be environmental co-benefits from planting trees. Purchasing offsets is understandably least favorable because it increases project costs without any local benefits.
Thus, the hypothesis that cities are rational in terms of selecting climate policies is supported by the above pattern of local climate policy adoption. Low-hanging fruits are picked first and most frequently, while the more resource-demanding policies are less popular and often adopted by a subgroup of the low-hanging fruit pickers.
Are mitigation and adaptation motivated the same way?
Tables 4 and 5 depict the marginal effects of city characteristics on its likelihood of adopting mitigation actions from Table 2 . Local characteristics such as population size, income and education levels, political preference and racial composition are statistically significant predictors of more systematic local climate policy efforts, such as inventory and target setting. But they are less significant predictors for the more widely-adopted policies, as reflected by the pseudo R-squares. In fact, these local characteristics have no power to predict whether a city adopts climate change or GHG related language in its general plan. This is not surprising because adopting language in general plan may be simply a rhetorical exercise and determined by random factors. However, different from results of studies on the determinants of local climate policy commitment, the result here suggests that size rather than income or education level of a city is associated with local climate actions. Results about political preference and racial composition are less strong, but seem to indicate that cities with more democrats, green party members, or a larger white population are more likely to adopt local climate actions.
( Tables 4 and 5) However, it does not seem that cities adopting adaptation policies share much of the same characteristics as those adopting mitigation policies. A pair of questions on mitigation and adaptation enables us to compare cities" adoption of the two types of climate actions.
Among the 331 surveyed cities in 2008, 44% required a CEQA analysis of the impacts of a proposed project on climate change (a formal mitigation analysis), while only 16% required a CEQA analysis of the impacts of climate change on a proposed project (a formal adaptation analysis). There was a positive correlation (with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.26) between cities" adoption of the two policies. Among the cities requiring adaptation analysis, 74% required mitigation analysis, while the reverse ratio is only 27%. Compared to mitigation, local adaptation actions are much more directly linked to climate change related risks perceived by local residents and decision makers than the factors that are commonly considered to affect local willingness to contribute to global public good. This is confirmed by the regression (not reported here)
of cities" adaptation policy on the independent variables in Table 4 -the usual predictors (size, socio-economic status, and political preference) of cities" mitigation actions have no power in explaining whether a city requires a CEQA analysis of the impacts of climate change on a proposed project.
( Table 6 ) Table 6 presents results from a series of simple Probit regressions using alternative local characteristics including local climate, geographic coordinates, and location on the West
Coast. The only powerful predictor of adaptation is whether a California city is located on the West Coast. The correlation between adaptation policy and the coastal dummy is 0.15 (significant at 1% level), as shown in Model 1. This is in contrast to the nonsignificant correlation coefficient of 0.04 between the respective mitigation policy and the coastal dummy. Restricting the sample of cities in the regression to just cities in the coastal counties further confirm the importance of being exactly on the coast line rather than in close proximity (see Model 2). The coefficient of the coastal dummy remains statistically significant at the same magnitude as in Model 1. Models 3 and 4 both suggest that geographical locations do not predict adaptation. City elevation, another predictor of sea level rise risk, is also insignificant once coastal city is controlled for (not reported here). Somewhat unexpectedly, the result of Model 5 does not seem to support that adaptation action is affected by how hot and/or dry the local climate is. This is contrary to the fact that many California cities are subject to effects of extreme weather conditions, which can result in draught, wildfire, and heat wave. (Table 7) Using the same regressors for local mitigation actions, Table 7 shows the marginal effects of cities" characteristics on their likelihood of being a member of the MCPA or the ICLEI-CCP. Consistent with results on the climate actions, city size, political preference and racial composition affect a city"s likelihood to join the MCPA or the ICLEI-CCP.
The only difference is that income level is significant in this commitment behavior but not the climate actions examined in Section 4. ( Table 8) Compared to the effects of being a MCPA signatory, the ICLEI-CCP membership is a much stronger and more consistent predictor of a city"s climate actions. Signing the MCPA may predict a city"s claim that they have some policy/programs, but is not statistically associated with the more systematic efforts, i.e., the inventory or target setting behaviors. This is understandable given that the MCPA is a voluntary agreement that once signed by a mayor, commits a city to reducing local GHG emissions and lobbying for state and federal climate change actions. In contrast, the ICLEI-CCP is a paid membership with technical assistance provided by ICLEI staff to help cities with a "milestone" approach, in which members agree to: 1) conduct an emissions inventory and projection; 2) set a target for controlling emissions; 3) create a local action plan for achieving that target; 4) implement policies from the plan; and monitor and report on their progress. Thus, it seems that cities may keep their "easy" promises by taking some "easy" actions. A commitment will meaningfully increase the likelihood of adopting substantial climate actions only if such a commitment involves actual resource input.
Conclusion
Understanding why local governments succeed or fail to adopt certain climate actions is important. Federal and state policy makers can design policies and direct technical assistance more effectively with an improved understanding of why local climate efforts vary across jurisdictions. The lack of accurate information of actions taken by local governments and explanations of the great variation in local climate policy adoption directly impairs our ability to more effectively motivate and assist local climate actions.
This study expands the literature of quantitative local climate actions research from the commitment stage to the point where a range of substantial actions is adopted. It empirically tests whether the same local characteristics predict mitigation and adaptation, and whether cities actually move from commitment to action. Some climate policies are more widely adopted among cities than others. The pattern of selective policy adoption indicates that cities adopt individual actions more often than systematic efforts, and adopt policies with cost reduction or other co-benefits more often than policies that simply incur additional costs. This is consistent with hypothesis of co-benefits and the idea that low-hanging fruits get picked first. City size and political preference are important Last but not least, studies are needed with local climate actions measured not only by policy adoption, but also by outcomes of these policies. Calculated a community-wide GHG emissions baseline 15% 27%
Tables
Adopted a community-wide GHG emission reduction target 9% 14% Sequestration (e.g., planting of trees) 23%
Purchase of offsets (e.g., payment of a fee for participation in other funding mechanism for GHG reductions off-site) 
2%

